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Larceny of Referendum Petitions
In the Green County Criminal Court was heard and deter-
mined State of Missouri v. Richard McCulloch.1 The indictment
was in three counts and omitting formal phraseology was in the
following language :2
"Richard McCulloch and Bruce Cameron,' on the fifteenth
day of June, one thousand nine hundred and eighteen, at the
city of St. Louis, aforesaid, into a certain building of Daniel K.
Catlin, Theron E. Catlin, Irene C. Allen and Julius Pitzman, there
situate and being, which said building was then and there occu-
pied and used for offices, feloniously and burglariously, forcibly
did break and enter, with the felonious intent then and there and
thereby feloniously and burglariously to steal, take and carry
away certain goods, wares, merchandise, other valuable things
and personal property in the aforesaid building then and there
kept and deposited; and in said building three hundred and sixty-
nine (369) paper pamphlets, each of which pamphlets contained
eight (8) leaves, and upon the first leaf of each of which said
pamphlets was printed as a title thereof the following words, to
wit:
" 'Petition for Referendum on United Railways Compro-
mise Bill,' of the goods, wares, merchandise, other valuable
things and personal property of one Edward H. Heilman, of the
value of twenty-two dollars and eighty-seven ($22.87) cents, in
the aforesaid building then and there being found, then and
there feloniously and burglariously did steal, take and carry
away, with the felonious intent then and there to permanently
deprive the owner of the use thereof, and to convert the same
to their own use, against the peace and dignity of the State.
1. The author has been furnished the briefs prepared in the cause
by both plaintiff and defendant. Acknowledgment is here made to Hon-
orable Lawrence McDaniel and Honorable Elliott W. Maior for their
kindness.
2. Brief for plaintiff, pp. 2-5.
3. Bruce Cameron was apparently granted a severance.
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"And the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid,
do further present that Richard McCulloch and Bruce Cameron,
on the fifteenth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and
eighteen, at the City of St. Louis, aforesaid, into a certain build-
ing of Daniel K. Catlin, Theron E. Catlin, Irene C. Allen and
Julius Pitzman, there situate and being, which said building was
then and there occupied and used for offices, and which said
building was then and there tenanted by and in the possession
of one Edward H. Heilman, feloniously and burglariously, forc-
ibly did break and enter, with the felonious intent then and
there and thereby feloniously and burglariously to steal, take and
carry away certain goods, wares, merchandise, other valuable
things and personal property in the aforesaid building then and
there kept and deposited; and in said building three hundred and
sixty-nine (369) paper pamphlets, each of which pamphlets con-
tained eight (8) leaves, and upon the first leaf of each of which
said pamphlets was printed as a title thereof the following words
to wit:
" 'Petition for Referendum on United Railways Compro-
mise Bill,' of the goods, wares, merchandise, other valuable
things and personal property of the said Edward H. Heilman,
of the value of twenty-two dollars and eighty-seven ($22.87)
cents, in the aforesaid building then and there being found, then
and there feloniously and burglariously did steal, take and carry
away, with the felonious intent then and there to permanently
deprive the owner of the use thereof, and to convert the same to
their own use; against the peace and dignity of the State.
"And the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid,
do further present that Richard McCulloch and Bruce Cameron,
on the fifteenth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and
eighteen, at: the City of St. Louis, aforesaid, into a certain
building of Edward H. Heilman, there situate and being, which
said building was then and there occupied and used for offices,
feloniously and burglariously, forcibly did break and enter, with
the felonious intent then and there and thereby feloniously and
burglariously to steal, take and carry away certain goods, wares,
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merchandise, and other valuable things and personal property in
the aforesaid building, then and there kept and deposited, and in
said building three hundred and sixty-nine (369) paper pamph-
lets, each of which pamphlets contained eight leaves (8), and
upon the first leaf of each of which said pamphlets was printed
as a title thereof the following words, to wit:
" 'Petition for Referendum on United Railways Compro-
mise Bill,' of the goods, wares, merchandise, other valuable
things and personal property of the said Edward H. Heilman, of
the value of twenty-two dollars and eighty-seven ($22.87) cents,
in the aforesaid building then and there being found, then and
there feloniously and burglariously did steal, take and carry away,
with the felonious intent then and there to permanently deprive
the owner of the use thereof, and to convert the same to their
own use, against the peace and dignity of the State.
"Lawrence McDaniel,
"Circuit Attorney."
It will be observed that the indictment charged both burglary
in the second degree and larceny.4 A demurrer to the indict-
ment was overruled but after the plaintiff had presented its
testimony a so-called demurrer to the evidence was sustained.
Presumably a verdict of acquittal was directed for defendant.,"
It will be assumed that the testimony established (for the pur-
pose of a directed verdict) the fact that referendum petitions
as specified in the indictment were stolen and that there was also
written on the petitions the ward, precinct, name and residence
of each signer and that an affidavit and acknowledgment was at-
tached to each petition.6 It followed, therefore, that the basic
4. R. S. Mo., 1909, Sec. 4520, 4528.
5. See note by R. E. Murray, p. 25.
6. Hon. Elliott W. Major, counsel for defendant, wrote the author
as follows: "On the trial the evidence upon the part of the state was
that nothing was taken except duly signed and acknowledged referen-
dum petitions. These referendum petitions had printed thereon the or-
dinance being referred, the ward, precinct, name and residence of each
signer and an acknowledgment and affidavit attached to each petition
making same complete in every respect."
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question involved was whether the referendum petitions under
the evidence were subject matter of larceny. Judge Orin Pat-
terson decided the question in the negative and gave the follow-
ing opinion.
7
"JUDGE PATTERSON: Well, gentlemen, the Court has
decided to put its conclusions about this demurrer in writing.
"It would take a rather extended opinion to adequately dis-
cuss the decisions at law that are involved in the demurrer to
the evidence. In this written statement that the court has pre-
pared of its conclusions there is no attempt to adequately discuss
the law applicable to the case. It, as you will find when I read
it to you, represents merely the conclusions of the court about
the law that is applicable to this case. It is as follows:
"One of the essential elements of the charge of burglary
in this case is an intent to steal. The things that were taken
were referendum petitions. There is a statute that makes a bill
introduced in either branch of the Legislature the subject of lar-
ceny. There is no statute that makes a referendum petition the
subject of larceny.
"Whether the wrongful taking of referendum petitions is
evidence of an intent to steal or constitutes larceny depends on
whether or not referendum petitions are personal property. The
referendum petitions, when taken, were in the custody of Mr.
Proske, one of the five committeemen. They were to be filed
with the Election Commissioners of St. Louis the following day.
They were signed by more than 10,000 voters of St. Louis. They
contained an application to the Board of Aldermen of the city
of St. Louis to repeal an ordinance known as the United Rail-
ways Compromise bill, or to refer that ordinance to the voters of
St. Louis for their rejection or approval.
"The purpose of the referendum petitions was a purely pub-
lic purpose of a legislative nature.
7. The copy of the opinion was furnished by Circuit Attorney Mc-
Daniel, counsel for plaintiff. It agrees with the report of the decision in
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for September 8, 1920, except that the
newspaper report omits the first two and unimportant paragraphs.
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"The committeemen for the petitioners, the circulators and
the signers of petitions were acting in a legislative capacity to
accomplish that purpose. When the referendum petitions were
taken, they were operative for that purpose alone. When the
things taken became petitions they ceased to be pamphlets or
blank referendum petitions dedicated to the use of accomplish-
ing the repeal of a law.
"They were therefore written instruments because they
represented an operative obligation. Under the common law
written instruments were not the subjects of larceny. Under
section 4927 of our statutes only such written instruments as
affect pecuniary obligations or such written instruments as affect
title to property are personal property and, as such property, the
subject of larceny. Referendum petitions operative only for a
public purpose of a legislative nature are not within this statute.
Anything to be property must be something of some appreciable
pecuniary value.
"Property is something that is the subject of ownership
about which the owner can do practically as he pleases-burn it
or otherwise destroy it if he wants to.
"It is something that the owner can sell or trade. Generally
it is something that the owner can devise, or that goes to his
heirs at his death. Referendum petitions lack all of these at-
tributes of personal property. The idea of ownership of refer-
endum petitions would be inconsistent with their legislative pur-
pose. They are therefore public documents because devoted
solely to a public purpose and are not the subject of larceny. For
the above reasons the demurrer is sustained."
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
This statement appears in the opinion, supra: "Under the
common law written. instruments were not the subjects of lar-
ceny." No doubt the court's conviction was the result of the
brief furnished by defendant's counsel. At least that point of
view was urged again and again in the brief for defendant.8
8. Brief for defendant, p. 72, concludes as follows: "When the state
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It is believed that the authorities in England relating to the
subject matter of larceny justify no statement that includes
within the term "written instruments" more than (1) written in-
struments concerning lands in such a manner as to be said to "sav-
our" thereof and (2) choses in action.9
A review of the authorities in England becomes necessary.
The following may not be complete but every English decision
with any real bearing on the question that has come to the at-
tention of the writer is included.
Coke published his Institutes10 in 1628 and uttered the fol-
lowing: "It is said (?) though they be personal goods, yet if
they savour anything of the realty, no larceny can be committed
of them." Among the illustrations of his doctrine he gave, un-
fortunately, this example: "So it is of a box or chest with Chart-
ers, no larceny can be committed of them, because the Charters
concern the realty, and the box or chest though it be of great
value, yet shall it be of the same nature the Charters be: of and
omne ma/us dignum trahit ad fe minus.""
He seems not to have dealt with the question of choses in
says it is a charge for stealing paper only, the answer comes, that the
state in describing the things stolen, has described written instruments
and documents, which have absorbed the paper, and in their higher char-
acter, as such written instruments, are not the subject of larceny at
common law or under the statutes. The paper cannot be separated from
the writing and the state is foreclosed."
9. It might be pointed out that most instruments "savouring" of land
are also choses in action.
10. Coke's Third & Fourth Institute p. 109. Mr. Justice Stephen in
his excellent "History of the Criminal Law of England" gives a sum-
mary of the treatment of larceny by the earlier writers-Glanville. Brac-
ton, Britton, Mirror-and it seems safe to say that the problems here
considered had not then arisen. Vol. III, pp. 129-136.
11. "During the reign of Edward IV. many points connected with
the law of larceny were raised and discussed.
"One of the most curious occurred in 1471. It is referred to by
Coke as 10 Edw. 4, 14, but is described in the Year-book as 49 Hen. 6,
p. 14, No. 9.
"William Wody was indicted for stealing six boxes with charters and
muniments relating to real property. After much debate this was held,
before all the justices in the Exchequer Chamber, not to be felony. The
reasons seem to have been, partly because the deeds were not chattels
but were of the nature of real property, and partly because they had no
definite assignable value. As to the boxes, it was argued, and the court
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action until he delivered the opinion in Calye's case.12  There, by
the sheerest dictum it was stated that felony could not be com-
mitted of "charters, evidences, obligations, deeds, specialties, etc."
Aside from the inference that might be drawn from the doctrine
as to charters concerning realty this seems to have been the first
appearance in English law of the doctrine that a chose in action
was not the subject of larceny.' 3
In 1678 Hale published his Pleas of the Crown." He stated
the law as follows: "Therefore of chattels real no felony can be
committed, and therefore the taking away of a ward cannot be
felony, nor of a box or chest of charters, that concern land." In
a note it is added:"S "Nor can felony be committed of bonds,
notes, or other writings that are securities for a debt, because they
seems to have adopted the argument, that the boxes were of the same
nature as the deeds contained in them. This appears to me to be one of
the most pedantic and unmeaning decisions in the whole law." Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. III, pp. 138-139.
12. (1584) 8 Coke 63.
13. "The Year-books do not refer to choses in action other than
deeds. There is no decision that a bond, for instance, which did not
affect land was incapable of being stolen. Coke, however, who accepted
any sort of principle laid down in the Year-books as if it was a law of
nature, accepted this principle and applied it to all choses in action what-
ever. In Calye's case he gives an elaborate commentary on the writ in
the Register which defines the liability of innkeepers for the goods of
their guests. Some of its words, he says, 'extend to all moveable goods,
although of them felony cannot be committed, as of charters, evidences,
obligations, deeds, specialties etc.' The only authorities quoted for this
incidental statement are the case in the Year-book 10 Edw. 4, 14,
which has been already noticed, and which says nothing of any docu-
ments except title-deeds to land; FitzHerbert, Indictments, 19; and
Broke, Corone, 155 (it should be 154) ; both of which are mere abridg-
ments of the case in the Year-books. Hence the doctrine that a chose
in action cannot be stolen, which has for its consequence the absurd con-
clusion that a bank note cannot be stolen, rests upon no foundation ex-
cept a wholly unauthorized extension made by Coke, in treating of a
different subject, of a case in the Year-books, which was itself ap-
parently an invention of the judges in the fifteenth century, resting, more-
over, upon a principle which does not apply to documents not relating to
lands. In the present day it would be too late to dispute this doctrine,
as it has been implicitly recognized by a great deal of legislation found-
ed upon it." Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. III.
p. 144.
14. "Coke and Hale repeat the earlier authorities but add little to
them." Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. III, p. 141.
15. Hale's Pleas of the Crown, Vol. I, p. 510.
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derive their value from choses en action, which cannot be stol.
en." 16
In J716 Hawkins published his Treatise of the Pleas of the
Crown 17 and addressing himself as to "what are such goods, the
stealing whereof may amount to felony" he stated (1) "They
ought to be no way annexed to the freehold;" and (2) "they
ought to have some worth in themselves, and not to derive their
whole value from the relation they bear to some other thing,
which cannot be stolen, as paper or parchment on which are
written assurances concerning lands, or obligations, or coven-
ants, or other securities for a debt or other chose in action."",
Blackstone, in his commentaries, published in 1765, extends
the doctrines no further. "...... Upon nearly the same principle
the stealing of writings relating to a real estate is no felony, but
a trespass; because they concern the land, or (according to our
technical language) savor of the realty, and are considered as
part of it by the law, so that they descend to the heir, together
with the land which they concern.
"Bonds, bills, and notes, which concern mere choses in action
were also at the common law held not to be such goods whereof
larceny might be committed, being of no intrinsic value, and not
16. "It is obvious that it is physically impossible to misappropriate
a right of action against the world at large, such as the copyright of
a book or a patent to an invention, though it is possible to infringe and so
to diminish or destroy its value. It is equally obvious that it is physical-
ly impossible to misappropriate a right of action against a particular per-
son. No one can steal a debt, or a share in a partnership, or stock in
the funds, but this ought to be coupled with the observation that there
is no difficulty in misappropriating things which are valuable only as the
symbols of debts or other liabilities, such as promissory notes, bonds,
bank-notes, share and stock certificates." Stephen, History of Crimin-
al Law in England, Vol. III, pp. 125-126.
17. Book I, ch. 33, Secs. 34, 35.
18. Hawkins states the reason for this doctrine to be that "they be-
ing of no manner of use to any one but the owner, are not supposed to
be so much in danger of being stolen, and therefore need not to be pro-
vided for in so strict a manner as those things which are of a known
price, and everybody's money." Such'may have been good social policy
at one day but unfortunately as social and economic conditions changed,
the rule did rot except by statutes.
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importing any property in possession of the person from whom
they are taken."'19
In East's Crown Law20 the doctrines of the earlier common
law were summarized as follows:
"As larceny cannot be committed of things real at com-
mon law, neither can it be committed of charters or
other written assurances concerning the realty, because
they savour of the same nature; or as some writers
say, because they are not in themselves of any value;
though Lord Coke and Staundford give the same rule
as to the box or chest in which they are kept, to which
the latter reason would not apply." 21
"In order to make the stealing of goods felony, they
ought to have some worth in themselves, and not mere-
ly from their relation to some other thing: and therefore
bonds, bills, notes, and other securities, which concern
mere choses in action, were not the subjects of larceny
at common law, being of no intrinsic value, and not
importing any property in possession of the person from
whom they are taken." 22
So far nothing appears to indicate that there was any belief
among the earlier writers of conceded authority that larceny
was impossible of a written instrument as such.
Next must be considered the development of the law through
the modern cases. First will be considered cases involving in-
struments concerning real estate and then instruments which at
least resemble choses in action and finally what may be desig-
nated as public documents or instruments.
19. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, Lewis' Ed., p. 234.
20. Vol. II, Ch. XVI, Secs. 34, 36.
21. East's Crown Law, Vol. II, p. 596.
22. East's Crown Law, Vol. II, p. 597.
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INSTRUMENTS SAVOURING OF REALTY
In Rex v. Westbeer 2 the prisoner was indicted for theft of
a parchment writing, purporting to be a commission impowering
the commissioners therein named to enter and ascertain the
boundaries of certain manors and "to certify how high the water
of Furnace Pool ought to be kept" and also a parchment writing,
purporting to be a return made to the commission. The jury
returned a special verdict that the defendant was guilty of tak-
ing away "a parchment writing, value one penny, from the rec-
ords in the Court of Chancery" and "another parchment writing
annexed thereto, value one penny." It was objected on behalf
of prisoner (1) that being records the indictment ought to have
been on 8 Hen. VI. c. 12 S. 324 and (2) "that they concerned the
realty and could not become the subject of larceny, from their
constructive adherence to, and connection with the freehold."
The court considered only the second point and "were unani-
mously of opinion that these parchment writings concerned the
realty, and that therefore the prisoner was not guilty of the fel-
ony charged in the indictment." 25
William Powell was charged with burglariously breaking
and entering the dwelling-house of David Williams with intent
to steal "goods and chattels" therein. The prisoner had borrowed
two sums of money of Williams and had executed two mortgages
in fee of freehold land to Williams. The sums loaned were un-
23. (1739) 1 Leach's C. C. 12.
24. "III And moreover it is ordained, That if any Record, or Par-
cel of the same Writ, Return, Panel, Process, or Warrant of Attorney
in the King's Courts of Chancery, Exchequer, the one Bench or the oth-
er, or in his Treasury, be willingly stolen, taken away, withdrawn, or
avoided by any Clerk or by other Person, because whereof any Judg-
ment shall be reversed, that such Stealer, Taker away, Withdrawer, or
Avoider, their Procurators, Counsellors and Abettors thereof indicted,
and by Process thereupon made thereof duly convict by their own Con-
fession, or by Inquest to be taken by lawful Men, whereof the one half
shall be of the Men of any Court of the same Courts, and the other
half of other, shall be judged for Felons, and shall incur the Pain of
Felony. (2) And that the Judges of the said Courts of the one Bench
or of the other, have Power to hear and determine such Defaults before
them, and thereof to make due Punishment as afore is said."
25. Re.r v. Westbeer (1739) 1 Leach's C. C. 12 1. c. 14.
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paid and Powell entered with intent to steal the mortgage deeds.
The conviction was quashed, 26 the court saying:
"This finding makes it unnecessary to consider wheth-
er the securities savour of the realty or are evidence
of the title to real estate so as not to be the subject of
larceny, because, being subsisting securities for the pay-
ment of money, they are clearly choses in action, and,
as such, are not properly described in the indictment as
goods and chattels." 27
CHOSES IN ACTION
In Rex v. Clark28 the prisoner was charged with the theft
of a large number of promissory notes issued by the firm of
Messrs. Large and Son and made payable at Brown, Cobb & Co.,
in London. The notes in question had been paid and when
stolen were in a parcel directed to Messrs. Large & Son. The
latter firm was permitted by act of parliament to reissue the
notes for three years. In consequence of the loss they would
be compelled to issue other notes with other stamps. The in-
dictment charged the stealing of (a) promissory notes and (b)
"pieces of paper" stamped with a stamp "of a certain value."
At a meeting of "all the judges" the conviction under (b) was
held proper since "the paper and stamps, particularly the latter,
were valuable to the owners." 29
26. Regina v. Powell (1852) 2 Denison's C. C. 403.
27. Regina v. Powell (1852) 2 Denison's C. C. 403, 1. c. 410.
See Regina v. Williams (1852) 6 Cox's C. C. 49, where a mortgage
deed and title deeds accompanying it were held subject matter for lar-
ceny within 7 & 8 Geo. 4., C. 29, S. 5., making it a felony to steal "any
debenture, deed, bond, bill, note, warrant, order, or other security what-
soever, for money or for payment of money."
28. (1810) Russel & Ryan 181.
29. Rex v. Clark (1810) Russel & Ryan 181 1. c. 183. See II Rus-
sel on Crimes, 9th Ed., p. 269, note: "If a chattel be valuable to the pos-
sessor, though not saleable, and of no value to anyone besides, it may still
be the subject of larceny."
Compare this statement in the opinion of Judge Patterson, supra:
"Anything to be property must be something of some appreciable pecuni-
ary value." That view seems indefensible as a matter of principle. If
one has possession of an object that is valuable to him alone and valu-
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In Rex v. Vyse3 0 the prisoner was tried for receiving with
guilty knowledge certain stolen property described in the indict-
ment as (I) thirty pieces of paper and (2) thirty valuable se-
curities.' Whitehead and Co., bankers, had issued 1£ promis-
sory notes. As these were paid by Glyn & Co. in London they
able for any reason peculiar to him there is need of protecting him in
that possession. Otherwise, society ceases to function in a matter of so-
cial importance and the individual is tacitly invited to use his physical
strength even tho it endangers the public order. There is neither time
nor space to fully examine this phase of the law of larceny but the fol-
lowing decisions are believed to be representative of the English law.
Regina v. Godfrey (1838) 8 Car. & P. 563: Indictment for theft of
(1) six sheets of paper, and (2) a paper parcel containing two letters.
Alexander, for prosecution, stated in opening statement that prisoner
opened packatge and letters, read them, and "then disposed of them in
such manner as he thought proper." Lord Abinger, C. B., directed an
acquittal evidently thinking that the trespass must be done with intent
to gain some advantage. But quaere. Decision may be justified. No
showing that prisoner converted the letters. In Regina v. Jones (1846)
1 Denison's C. C. 1. c. 196, Bros for the crown, stated: "R. v. Godfrey,
8 C. & P. 563, seems not to be law."
Regina v. Jones (1846) 1 Denison's C. C. 192, 2 C. & K. 236. Pris-
oner took letter addressed to another person and burned it in order to
prevent the possibility of an unfavorable recommendation from the per-
son to whom the letter was addressed. Held, larceny. Sufficient ad-
vantages to prisoner without admitting any necessity for lucri causa. In
argument, Bros for the Crown stated: "The definitions of larceny in the
Mirror, Bracton, Coke's Institutes, Lord Hale, Mr. Sergeant Hawkins,
and Lombard,-none of them contain the words 'lucri causa;' and Mr.
Justice Blackstone is the first who introduces them, and the definition of
larceny given by Mr. Serjeant Russel is taken from Justinian."
Regina v. Privelt and Goodhall (1846) 1 Denison's C. C. 197. Pris-
oners were servants of prosecutor and apparently took their master's
oats and secreted them in a loft for purpose of giving to their master's
horses and without intent of applying to their own benefit. Held, lar-
ceny even tho no lucri causa. Two of eleven judges dissented because
no intent to deprive owner of property in goods.
Regina v. Wynn (1848) 1 Denison's C. C. 365, 2 C. & K. 859. Pris-
oner, employee in postoffice, made mistake with reference to sorting two
letters containing money and to avoid a supposed penalty attaching to
his mistake secreted the letters in a water closet with intent to destroy
them. Held, larceny.
In applying the above to the opinion rendered by Judge Patterson
it is to be remembered that the indictment alleged that the paper pamph-
lets were of the value of twenty-two dollars and eighty-seven cents and
there is no statement that the plaintiff failed to give evidence to prove
this allegation.
30. (1829) 1 Moody's C. C. 218.
31. The first count charged: "That he, - - - - , thirty pieces of
paper of great value, towit, of 309 each, the said pieces of paper being
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were wrapped up in bundles and labeled. About forty of these
bundles in a bag were stolen from one of the partners of White-
head and Co. It appears to have been possible for Whitehead
and Co. to reissue such paid notes. Ten judges held the con-
viction right, some of them "doubted whether the notes could
properly be called valuable securities; but, if not, they all thought
they were goods and chattels." 32 It seems that the correct point
of view as'to this case was uttered by Maule, J., in Regina v.
Watts: "The notes were nothing but paper until re-issued, be-
cause they derived their whole operation from being delivered to
some one." 33
At nisi prius was determined Rex v. Mead.3 " The defend-
ant was indicted for embezzling (a) "pieces of paper of the value
of one penny and (b) 'pieces of paper partly written and partly
printed,' bearing stamps, the values of whichwere specified."
The proof was that the articles stolen were "halves of country
bank -notes." The sentence of the prisoner was justified on the
ground that the halves might have been of value to prosecutor
"by his putting the two halves together." 35
John Atkinson on his way home was rushed upon., knocked
down and beaten till he was disabled. The prisoners then rifled
stamped with a stamp, value 5d., the same being the stamp directed and
required by the statute in such case made and provided, on every prom-
issory note for payment to the bearer on demand for every sum of mon-
ey not exceeding 1£ Is., of the goods and chattels of John Whitehead
and others, lately before stolen, etc., - - - feloniously did receive -
- - said pieces of paper so stamped, and each and every of said stamps
being then available and of full force and effect, against the statute,
etc." The third count was for "feloniously receiving on the same day
at the same parish, thirty valuable securities commonly called promissory
notes, each of the said valuable securities being for payment to the bear-
er on demand of the sum of 19 and the value of 12 of the property of
John Whitehead and others" etc. Rex v. Vyse (1829) 1 Moody's C. C.
218.
32. Rex v. Vyse (1829) 1 Moody's C. C. 218 1. c. 223.
33. (1854) 6 Cox's C. C. 304 1. c. 306.
34. (1831) 4 Car. & P. 535.
35. Counsel for prisoner argued that "these halves of country bank
notes were not goods and chattels. If the notes had been entire, they
would have been choses in action, not goods and chattels; but, in their
present state, they were of no valve."
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his pockets and when Atkinson "came to himself" he missed a
"slip of paper" "which contained a memorandum of a sum of
money which a person owed him." The prisoners were indicted
for robbing John Atkinson of 'one piece of writing paper of the
value of one penny, one other piece of paper, of the value of one
penny, and one written memorandum, of the value of one penny,
of the goods and chattels of the said John Atkinson.' They
were found guilty at nisi prius, Gurney, B., declaring: "If any-
thing was taken away from the prosecutor by violence, however
insignificant its value, that is sufficient to constitute robbery. In
cases of robbery, the value is immaterial, and the prosecutor, by
carrying this memorandum in his pocket, showed that he con-
sidered that it was of some value to 'hinself."1 (Italics sup-
plied.)
In Regina v. Murtagh17 the prisoner was indicted for theft
of "one half of a certain promissory note for the payment of
money, to wit, for the payment of the sum of twenty pounds,
which said one half of the said promissory note was numbered
4432, of the goods and chattels of one James Savage." During
the argument before submitting the case to the jury the statement
was made that the article was one half of a Bank of Ireland
note and it was urged that the indictment was defective in fail-
ing to allege that the article had a value. In arresting the
judgment following a verdict of guilty, however, Doherty, C. J.,
placed his decision on the basis that the article was "a mere chose-
in action, and of no intrinsic value." 3s
It is possible to reconcile this case with Rex v. Mead, supra,
if it be assumed that in the preceding case a half of a bank note-
36. Rex v. Bingley and Law (1833) 5 Car. & P. 602. No consider-
ation was apparently given to the possibility that the memorandum was
a chose in action, or more properly, evidence of a chose in action. Per-
haps this was the result of a tendency by the English courts to limit
the unfortunate dictum of Lord Coke.
37. (1840) 1 Crawf. & Dix 355.
38. See Rex v. Johnson (1815) 3 M. & S. 539 1. c. 550: "The sub-ject of this indictment is bank notes which were not the subject of lar-
ceny at the common law, because they fell under the denomination of
choses in action." (dictum)
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could not be redeemed and that it ceased to be a valuable secur.-
ity by reason of being only a half.
In Regina v. Perry"9 the indictment was in several counts,
two of which were for stealing (1) an order for the payment of
money and (2) 'one piece of paper of the value of one penny.'
The Great Western Railway Company in order to pay a debt
drew a check at Paddington.upon their London bankers and sent
it to the superintendent at the Taunton station. The latter hand-
ed it to the chief clerk with orders to pay it to the overseer. The
chief clerk converted the same and later cashed it with a trades-
man in Taunton and applied the proceeds to his own use. Coun-
sel for defendant (chief clerk) raised the point that the cheque
was void for failure to have a stamp affixed thereon. Thirteen
judges held the conviction right "as, at all events, there was a
stealing of a piece of paper, which was sufficient to sustain, a
count for larceny." 40
During the argument of the case the following occurred :41
"Cresswell, J.-If a blank cheque were stolen,
would that be larceny?
"Rowe. 42-I think it would.
"Cresswell, J.-Then is it less the subject of lar-
ceny for being filled up?
"Rowe.-That is the doctrine laid down in Hawk-
ins, as I understand it."
"Alderson, B.-Suppose an autograph of great
value written on a sheet of paper, would that prevent
it from being the subject of larceny ?" "
39. (1845) 1 Car. & K. 725, 1 Cox C. C. 222.
40. Regina v. Perry (1845) 1 Car. & K. 725 1. c. 729.
41. Regina v. Perry (1845) 1 Cox's C. C. 222 1. c. 224. Compare:
Regina v. Walter Watts (1850) 2 Denison's C. C. 14. (a cancelled cheque
fraudulently destroyed by a clerk. Held guilty of stealing a "piece of
paper." That such was subject-matter of larceny not controverted. Dis-
cussion concerned distinction between larceny and embezzlement.)
42. Counsel for defendant.
43. The report of the case in 1 Car. & K. 728 has the following:
"W. C. Rowe.-It apeared to me that the effect of converting the paper
into a cheque was to make it valuable, if at all, as a security for money,
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In Regina v. Boulton,44 a prosecution for false pretenses, it
was held that an ordinary coupon railway ticket was a chattel
within the meaning of the statute punishing false pretenses.
Aside from the criticism of the decision for reasons not impor-
tant here 45 it has been suggested that the court overlooked the
'fact that the ticket was only evidence of a contract by the rail-
way to carry the holder.
4 6
In the well considered case of Regina v. Watts47 it was held
that larceny could not be committed where the subject matter was
a written agreement signed by prosecutor and prisoner, whereby
the latter had agreed to build two cottages for prosecutor. At
the time of the alleged theft work was going on under the agree-
ment and although prisoner had been paid all that was owing to
him still it was an executory agreement. 48  The prisoner had
been convicted of stealing a piece of paper and the prosecution
and that, the moment the paper had a cheque written upon it, it became
a chose in action, which is not the subject of larceny. Alderson, B.-The
nature of the paper is not so wholly absorbed in the chose in action as
you put it."
44. (1849) 1 Denison 508.
45. Regina v. Kilham (1870) 11 Cox's C. C. 561.
46. Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law, p. 250, note 2. Compare:
Regina v. Rodway (1841) 9 Car. & P. 784: Prisoner owed his land-
lord rent. Latter prepared, signed and stamped a receipt and demanded
payment. Prisoner permitted an examination of receipt. Then he paid
only part of amount due and went away. Apparently assumed that re-
ceipt was subject to larceny. Coleridge, J. thought prisoner guilty but
jury returned verdict of not guilty.
Regina v. Frampton (1846) 2 C. & K. 47. Facts same in effect as in
Regina v. Rodway, except the stamped paper was produced by prosecu-
tor, handed to prisoner who wrote out the receipt. Then it was signed
by all concerned, prisoner keeping one finger on it all the time. Pris-
oner walked away with receipt without making payment. Wightman, J.,
directed an acquittal distinguishing Regina v. Rodway because prosecu-
tor never had possession of receipt "in a complete state." Quaere as to
distinction.
Regina v. Smith (1852) 2 Denison's C. C. 449. Charged with lar-
ceny of receipt duly stamped of payment of money. Conviction quash-
ed because receipt not in possession of prosecutor. Apparently assumed
by all that receipt was subject-matter for larceny.
47. (1854) 6 Cox's C. C. 304.
48. "Martin, B.-And an action might be maintained upon it for not
building according to the specification." 1. c. 306.
"As to this not being a chose in action, because all that was due
had been paid upon it. it appears that the "agreement is still executory,
LARCENY OF REFERENbUM PETITIONS
attempted to avoid the rule that evidence of a chose in action
could not be the subject of larceny by urging (1) that all due
under the agreement had been paid and (2) that the want of a
stamp prevented it from being a chose in action. The conviction
was reversed, however, by the concurrence of ten judges.
Parke, B., dissented because the paper remained paper until the
instrument had been perfected by affixing a stamp.49  There
seemed to be no disagreement that the actual written agreement
could have been stamped at any time before offered in evidence.
In the particular case the written agreement could not be pro-
duced and secondary evidence was offered. Platt, B., effectively
answered Parke, B., by saying: "It woul4 surely be strange to
hold that it was no agreement until it was stamped, when the
necessity for a stamp arises from its being an agreement." 50 All
except Parke, B., seem to have thought that the paper in question
was the evidence of a chose in action and therefore within the
general rule. 51
The indictment in Regina v. Morrison 2 was in four counts:
(1) larceny of a warrant for delivery of a watch; (2) of a pawn-
broker's ticket; (3) of a piece' of paper; and (4) for receiving
all knowing them to have been stolen. The prisoner was con-
and might be used by either side to prove their rights." Lord Campbell,
C. 5. 1. c. 307.
This point, i. e. the agreement still executory, seems to have been
ignored in the discussion of the case in the brief for defendant, p. 21.
49. Lord Campbell ruled at the outset of the argument that the
stamp laws applied to criminal cases. 1. c. 305.
50. (1854) 6 Cox's C. C. 304 1. c. 309.
51. II Russell on Crimes, 9th Ed., makes the following comment on
the decision: "The matter of the agreement was of the value of twenty
pounds or upwards, and therefore by law required a stamp, but as be-
tween the parties to it, it would be available as an agreement without a
stamp, but no evidence was given on either point." Compare: Rex v.
Yates (1827) 1 Moody's C. C. 170. Charge of obtaining "an order for
the payment of the sum of 22," by false pretenses. Proof that pros-
ecutor sent "a check drawn upon Messrs. Child & Co. payable to D. Fran-
cis Jones for 2C." Held that "order was not a valuable security within
7 & 8 G. 4, as it ought to have been stamped and therefore the banker
would have subjected himself to a penalty of 509 by paying it." Observe
that there was no count 'for obtaining a piece of paper.
52. (1859) Bell's C. C. 158.
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victed on the fourth count and the question arose whether the
pawnbroker's ticket was the subject of larceny. The Court for
Crown Cases Reserved, in affirming the conviction, held that
"the pawnbroker's ticket may well be held to be a 'warrant for
the delivery of goods' within the meaning of 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29
S. 5." 53 The court was willing, however, to suppose that it was
wrong in the interpretation of the statute and advanced the
opinion "that the conviction was right as for stealing a pawn-
broker's ticket or piece of paper." 54 The argument advanced
by Crompton, J., was that the common law rule extended only
to (1) documents of title to real property and (2) choses in ac-
tion. His notion of a chose in action did not include an agree-
ment which represented a specific personal chattel "to the prop-
erty and right of possession of which the party has a right to
treat himself as entitled - - - -. The conclusion was,
therefore, that aside from statute a pawnbroker's ticket was the
subject of larceny as such or as a piece of paper. Furthermore,
the court in effect rejected the view that a piece of paper ceases
to be the subject of larceny merely because there appears upon
it a completed instrument or document. It is also interesting to
observe that the statute though couched in broad terms was
53. "V. And be it enacted, That if any Person shall steal any Tally,
Order or other Security whatsoever, entitling or evidencing the Title of
any Person or Body Corporate to any Share or Interest in any Pub-
lic Stock or Fund, whether of this Kingdom, or of Great Britain or of
Ireland, or of any foreign State, or in any Fund of any Body Corpor-
ate, Company, or Society, or to any Deposit in any Savings Bank, or
shall steal any Debenture, Deed, Bond, Bill, Note, Warrant, Order, or
other Security whatsoever for Money or for Payment of Money, whether
of this Kingdom, or of any Foreign State, or shall steal any Warrant
or Order for the Delivery or Transfer of any Goods or valuable Thing,
every such Offender shall be deemed guilty of Felony, of the same Na-
ture, and in the same Degree, and punishable in the same Manner as
if he had stolen any Chattel of like Value with the Share, Interest, or
Deposit to which the Security so stolen may relate, or with the Money
due on the Security so stolen or secured thereby and remaining unsatis-
fied, or with the Value of the Goods or other valuable Thing mentioned
in the Warrant or Order; and each of the several Documents hereinbe-
fore enumerated shall throughout this Act be deemed for every purpose
to be included under and denoted by the Words 'valuable Security'."
54. Regina v. Morrison (1859) Bell's C. C. 158, 1. c. 164.
55. Regina v. Morrison (1859) Bell's C. C. 158, 1. c. 165.
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not construed as conclusive of the whole field of larceny but as
supplemental to established common law conceptions. Anything
that may be stolen before the statute remains so unless clearly
eliminated. At least such seems to have been the point of view
of the English court.56
It seems reasonaly certain from. the above decisions that the
English courts have never considered the absurd and indefens-
ible rule relating to choses in action as applying to all written
instruments. Indeed, Regina v. Morrison, supra, refuses to ap-
ply the rule to an instrument that was evidence of an obligation
between parties. Is it not curious that an English court in the
middle of the nineteenth century is found to be restricting its
doctrine while an American court in the twentieth century is at-
tempting to extend a transplanted and anarchronistic notion that
rests on a fiction which is socially inexpedient?
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Another point of attack by defendant in the case under re-
view was that the referendum petitions were "public instru-
ments and not the subject of private or personal ownership" and
that "they were public documents, all the functions and uses of
which were public and had no private or personal functions or
uses." 57 At the same time defendant was careful to avoid the
assertion that the petitions were public records because of the
danger of Section 4543 R. S. Mo. 1909. It was argued that it
was not necessary to file the petitions but that they became com-
plete as soon as they were signed.58 The next step is not alto-
56. "We think, therefore, that we should be extending the rule fur-
ther than we are warranted by any authority in doing, if we were to hold
that it extended further than to cases where the document concerns
choses in action merely, and is only an agreement to deliver personal
property, not the party's own; - -------- Regina v. Morrison (1859)
Bell's C. C. 158, 1. c. 166.
57. Brief for defendant, p. 9.
58. Brief for defendant, p. 73:
"The State, while conceding referendum petitions were taken, says
the petitions are not completed instruments until filed and are not public
documents until filed. This contention, of course, is untenable in law or
reason. If, to make them completed instruments or public documents, it
were necessary to file the same, still, the charge as laid in the indictment
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gether clear but apparently it was expected that if a written in-
strument was also a public instrument or document it was (so to
speak) a written instrument raised to the nth degree and, there-
fore, more certainly a thing unprotected by criminal law.
An opinion is ventured that the position is unsound on prin-
ciple. How is it possible for a written instrument to be a "pub-
lic document" which has never been filed in a public office nor
come into the possession of a public officer? Suppose the in-
dictment had alleged that the petitions had been filed with and
were property of the Board of Election Commissioners.- Would
the charge have been sustained by testimony that they were com-
pletely signed and in the possession of one Edward H. Heilman
who expected to file them the next day? If the answer be in
the negative then it is obvious that the allegation made was the
only one the facts were capable of. Neither Heilman nor "the
committee of the petitioners" was under any legal duty to file
the petitions the next morning. In short, the petitions were no
carries the filing with it; having charged the taking of referendum pe-
titions, this, as stated before, would carry with it every essential element
to make the same completed referendum petitions, instruments or public
documents. There is no negative charge that any essential element or act
is wanting to make them either completed instruments or public docu-
ments.
"Referendum petitions, however, are completed the moment they are
signed by the voters, and that act makes them public documents and noth-
ing further is necessary. The mere filing adds nothing to the complete-
ness of the instrument, and being complete, it is necessarily a public docu-
ment, because the Constitution and the Charter of the City of St. Louis
make it such, and, furthermore, all its uses and functions are public."
59. "Sec. 4. Signatures, uniform papers, committee of petitioners,
affidavits, filing, names and addresses.-The signatures need not all be
appended to one paper, but all papers comprising any original or sup-
plemental petition under this article shall be uniform in character and
shall each set forth the ordinance in full and contain the reauest men-
tioned in section 2, and designate by names and addresses five persons
as the committee of the petitioners, and each such paper shall be veri-
fied by an affidavit stating the number of signatures thereto and that
each signature was made in affiant's presence by, as affiant verily believes,
the person whose name it purports to be; and all papers comprising
an original, or supplemental petition shall be assembled by the petitioners
and filed with the board of election commissioners as one instrument.
Each signer shall state opposite his signature his residence address. Any
person shall be deemed a registered voter within the meaning of this
article whose name is unerased on the registration books." Charter of
the City of St. Louis, Art. VII., Sec. 4, Rev. Code, St. Louis, 1914.
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more public documents until filed than a deed is a deed before
delivery or a promissory note is such until the last legally neces-
sary act is done.60
What does it matter if the petitions were public documents
or instruments? The English courts, at least, seem never to
have thought that a public document was not subject matter
of larceny. The only question that would seem to arise concerns
the question in whom th,' property61 will be laid.
Francis Walker stole "in the Inner Temple, one roll of parch-
ment, being records of the Court of Common Pleas at West-
minister, and containing remembrances and rolls of the said court,
and dockets of causes entered of record in the said court." Var-
ious counts were used to allege the property to be in various per-
sons from "our lord the King" to "Thomas Sherwin." The pris-
oner was found guilty at Old Bailey but the "learned Recorder
entertained very strong doubts, whether an actual existing rec-
ord of the courts at Westminister could properly be described as
mere parchment, so as to change its actual use and nature, and
reduce it to mere personal chattels" and played for the opinion
of the judges. In due time the judges met and held "that as
the records did not concern the realty, as was the case in Rex v.
Westbeer, stealing the parchment was larceny." 62
Counsel for defendant in the case under review attempted
to avoid the force of this decision by stating in their brief6 " that
the prosecution was under the statute of 7 & 8 Geo. 4., c. 29,
sec. 21. The only apparent authority for that statement is the
fact that the reporter by way of annotation copied the section
60. Rex v. Phipoe (1795) 2 Leach's C. C. 673 (compelling one by
duress of threats to life to sign a promissory note in perfect form does
not constitute property which may be subject matter of robbery; paper
and ink the property of prisoner and perhaps within her possession at
all times). See also Rex v. Hart (1833) 6 Car. & P. 106.
61. Larceny is, of course, a violation of a person's possession and
not his property but unfortunately the standard form of indictment uses
the term "property." See a scholarly dissertation in an excellent but
largely unknown treatise: Pollock and Wright, "Possession in The Com-
mon Law."
62. Rex v. Walker (1827) 1 Moody's C. C. 155.
63. Brief for defendant, p. 37-38.
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in the margin. Nowhere in the opinion is reference made to the
statute. Furthermore, the statute was not enacted until June
21, 1827, and it was therein provided: "That this Act shall.com-
mence on the first day of July in the present year." The opin-
ion 64 at the outset states that the prisoner was tried "in the
year 1826, for grand larceny." The decision of the Court for
Crown Cases Reserved was delivered in "Hilary 5 Term, 1827."
Therefore, the final opinion was delivered several months be-
fore the passage of the statute. Moreover, it would seem safe
to assume that grand larceny was a felony in England at that
day. The statute denounced acts which were made misdemean-
ors. 66
The Colonial Minister received two dispatches from the Lord
High Commissioner of the Islands and had copies printed for
private distribution. Twenty-eight copies were delivered to the
sub-librarian at the Colonial office. The prisoner took a copy
and was indicted for "stealing ten pieces of paper, value one
penny, the property of our Sovereign Lady the Queen." Martin,
B., instructed the jury that the only question it had to solve was
whether defendant "intended to deprive that office of all prop-
erty in them and to convert them to his own use." The verdict
was one of not guilty. It was observed by Martin, B., as fol-
lows:
"Such documents as these are clearly the subject of
larceny, and inasmuch as the stealing of the paper it-
self would have been a felony the fact of the paper
being printed on makes no difference, and indeed this
fact might in a great many instances materially increase
the value." 67
(To be continued)
64. Rex v. Walker (1827) 1 Moody's C. C. 155.
65. "A term of court, beginning on the 11th and ending on the
31st of January in each year." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 572.
66. It is stated in the brief for defendant, p. 38, with reference to
this decision that "it is clear that the judges decided nothing except that
he was guilty under the statute and by virtue of its terms." It is sub-
mitted that the error in this statement has been demonstrated.
67. Regina v. Guernsey (1858) 1 F. & F. 394.
